USA v. Christopher Young by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-9-2011 
USA v. Christopher Young 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Christopher Young" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 243. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/243 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 08-3832 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
      v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, 
                            Appellant 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                             
District Court  No. 2-06-cr-00710-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
______________                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2011 
 
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 9, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Christopher Young pled guilty to Hobbs Act Robbery and conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and to carrying a 
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firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1).  After the District Court accepted Young’s plea, Young 
filed multiple motions to withdraw his plea.  The District Court denied these 
motions.  Based on two prior felony convictions, the District Court classified 
Young as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and sentenced him, inter alia, 
to 280 months imprisonment.  Young timely appeals his sentence, arguing that he 
should not have been sentenced as a career offender.  Young also appeals the 
District Court’s Order denying his motions to withdraw his plea.1  We will affirm. 
Young argues that the District Court could not qualify him as a career 
offender under § 4B1.1 because one of the statutes under which he had been 
convicted was disjunctive—i.e., the statute under which Young was convicted can 
be violated in many different ways, some of which would qualify as felonies under 
§ 4B1.1, some of which would not.  We exercise plenary review over the district 
court’s decision to sentence Young as a career offender based on his prior 
convictions.  United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2009).   
It is true that a sentencing court should initially look to the statute of 
conviction to determine whether a conviction was a felony, as opposed to a 
misdemeanor, for purposes of § 4B1.1.  Id. at 208-09.  If the statute of conviction 
is disjunctive, however, and the statute alone does not conclusively indicate 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
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whether the conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor, the sentencing court 
may look beyond the statute to certain other documents in the record.  Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 
 The record presented to the District Court included a criminal complaint and 
a certified record of the state court judgment.  The District Court was entitled to 
consider both documents to determine whether Young’s convictions were felonies 
that qualified Young as a career offender.  Id.; United States v. Howard, 599 F.3d 
269, 272 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court may “rely[ ] on the terms of 
the plea agreement, the charging document, the transcript of colloquy between 
judge and defendant, or other comparable judicial records of sufficient reliability”).  
Because these documents conclusively showed that Young’s prior convictions 
qualified as felonies, the District Court did not err by sentencing him as a career 
offender. 
 Young also argues that the District Court erred by denying his motions to 
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing.  We review for an abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  A district court must 
consider three factors when evaluating a motion to withdraw a plea:  (1) whether 
the defendant meaningfully asserts actual innocence; (2) the defendant’s reasons 
for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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withdrawal.  United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 With respect to the first factor, Young does argue that he is actually innocent 
of the crime to which he pled.  However, “[b]ald assertions of innocence are 
insufficient to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 
252.  Rather, Young “must [ ] not only reassert innocence, but must give sufficient 
reasons to explain why contradictory positions were taken before the district court 
and why permission should be given to withdraw the guilty plea and reclaim the 
right to trial.”  Id. at 253 (quoting United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d 
Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized by United States 
v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011)).  He has not done so here, having 
“made a blanket assertion of innocence . . . , but offer[ing] no credible facts in 
support of his claim.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 253. 
 As to the second factor, Young claims that he should have been allowed to 
withdraw his plea because his plea was not voluntary and intelligent, due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.
2
  Specifically, Young argues that counsel was 
ineffective for informing him that he would be sentenced as a career offender 
based on his prior felony convictions.  To succeed on this appeal, Young must 
                                                 
2
 Although defendants generally cannot challenge the adequacy of counsel on 
direct appeal, this case fits into the “narrow exception to the rule . . . [w]here the 
record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance” because the 
District Court specifically held a hearing as to the adequacy of Young’s counsel 
5 
 
show, among other things, that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Premo v. 
Moore, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 733, 743 (2011).  Counsel’s performance is deficient 
where that performance fails to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.  
Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).  Counsel’s performance is 
objectively reasonable where counsel’s advice is legally correct.  As discussed 
above, Young did, in fact, qualify as a career offender.  Counsel’s advice was thus 
legally correct, and counsel’s performance was not deficient. 
 Finally, as to the third factor, “the Government need not show such 
prejudice when a defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other factors support 
a withdrawal of the plea.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 255.  Accordingly, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions to withdraw his plea. 
 Young has not shown that the District Court either erred in sentencing him 
as a career offender, or abused its discretion in denying his motions to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
prior to sentencing.  Jones, 336 F.3d at 254 (quoting United States v. Headley, 923 
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
